An inspector general's report looking into a 2014 White House gate jumping incident found that Secret Service response was compromised, in part, because of understaffing, outdated radios and low morale.

"Although they may have only indirectly contributed to the events of that night, underlying and continuing resource and management issues are negatively affecting the Uniformed Division and, potentially, its ability to protect the White House and its occupants," the report said.

Related: Read the report

The report centered on the Sept. 19, 2014-event where a man named Omar Gonzalez jumped the Pennsylvania Avenue fence and made it into the White House in under 30 seconds before being apprehended.

The Department of Homeland Security's inspector general found that the Secret Service's Uniformed Division was so severely understaffed that it was 96 officers below its authorized number on the day of the incident. The staffing shortage led to overtime shift, canceled leave and little in-house training.

The OIG said the failure to capture Gonzalez was also compounded by a series of failures, including with radio communications, Joint Operations Center notification systems and visibility around the White House.

The report noted that Gonzalez jumped a 7-foot-6-inch point of the fence that was under construction and surrounded by bushes that obscured Secret Service agents view.

Once the intruder was over the fence, at least one Emergency Response Team post didn't have audio capability, while others had transmission difficulties caused by outdated radios and inadequate training.

The report found that the Secret Service's Uniformed Division was woefully untrained on the radio system, with less than 5 percent of the 592 hours of training of new officers devoted to communications.

The OIG also said that the Secret Service had cut funding for the Information Resource Management Division's radio life cycle support beginning in fiscal 2007, leaving the IRMD with insufficient resources to replace them.

Funding for a "technology refresh" was nearly halved in 2013 from $12.1 million to $6.7 million due to sequestration cuts, further compromising efforts to update communications equipment.

A detection system that spotted Gonzalez had no audible alarm. The system, which was installed a year prior to the security breach, had its audible alert feature removed by the Secret Service in order to "minimize panic and disruption in the White House."

But without any warning, agents weren't aware of the intruder, even though security on the North fence had followed protocol and activated the alarm system. Another alarm system in the North portico didn't sound at all, leaving agents unaware that an intruder was approaching.

One member of the Uniformed Division was tasked with locking the doors of the North portico in case of a security breach, but that agent hadn't received radio transmissions warning of an intruder, so Gonzalez was able to enter through the White House doors before agents were alerted to him.

Much of the report was redacted for security reasons, but the OIG made 14 recommendations, among them were:

  • Develop scheduled tests of radio functionality around the White House
  • Enhance radio training for Uniformed Division agents
  • Establish protocols for JOC video monitoring
  • Prioritize funding for the IRMD’s technology refresh request
  • Conducting annual assessments of the White House and JOC’s radio, alarm and video functionality
  • Continue to replacement and assess the security of fences and foliage heights on the north side of the White House.
  • Ensure the Uniformed Division is fully staffed without using overtime shifts to fill coverage
  • Adjust scheduling to ensure experienced agents are present on all shifts.
  • Establish regular joint training for the White House and presidential protect details.

The Secret Service concurred with all recommendations and was working to implement them.

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