In a memo dated March 6 and released publicly Friday, Hegseth directs all DOD components to use the Pentagon’s Software Acquisition Pathway, as well as other authorities created to leverage commercial capabilities — all in an effort to speed up the process for fielding software-heavy systems.

“The Department of Defense has been slow to recognize that software-defined warfare is not a future construct, but the reality we find ourselves operating in today,” Hegseth said in the memo, which is addressed to all senior Pentagon leaders, combatant commanders and field activity directors. “When it comes to software acquisition, we are overdue in pivoting to a performance-based outcome and, as such, it is the warfighter who pays the price.”

Senior defense officials told reporters Friday the memo is the first of what will likely be a series of steps from Hegseth, who has said on several occasions he wants to change the way the military buys and builds both software and hardware. The officials requested anonymity to speak freely about the secretary’s guidance.

The Defense Department created the Software Acquisition Pathway in 2020 as the recommended approach for buying software. The pathway offers a tailored acquisition mechanism, recognizing that software can’t, and shouldn’t, be procured under the same process as an aircraft or ship.

DOD program offices adopted the approach fairly broadly, and today 82 programs representing each of the military services are using the pathway to buy a range of capabilities — from command-and-control systems to cyber. The problem, according to one official, is that the pathway hasn’t been combined with other authorities designed to attract and take advantage of commercial capabilities.

Those authorities include an approach championed by the Defense Innovation Unit called a Commercial Solutions Opening, a type of solicitation that allows startups and non-traditional defense companies to sell products and services to DOD. DIU also leverages a contracting tool called Other Transaction awards, which isn’t subject to the same regulations as a standard contract and allows the government to award contracts on faster timelines.

As part of Hegseth’s memo requiring use of the Software Acquisition Pathway, he calls for acquisition organizations to make Commercial Solutions Openings and Other Transaction contracting approaches “the default” for buying capabilities.

“Department components are prohibited from implementing further guidance on this point that would set out restrictive measures, guidelines, frameworks, directives or policies other than required by statute,” he said.

The under secretary of acquisition and sustainment, as well as DIU — because of its experience with these tools — will craft an implementation plan over the next month.

DIU expects to see an uptick in the number of program offices wanting to work with the organization to procure software using these methods, one official said. As part of the implementation plan, the department will identify what resources DIU will need to support the increased workload and help train acquisition officials on how to use these authorities.

“The combination of DIU innovation with acquisition modernization is creating a streamlined mechanic to both deliver capability fast and simultaneously open up the industry base to a broader audience,” one official said.

Airmen and guardians will soon be able to take advantage of the Hypori Halo Workspace Anywhere program that grants access to government apps, email, NIPRNet, sensitive data, and CAC-enabled websites via personal devices, including a phone or tablet, whether they’re in the office or not.

A spokesperson for Hypori did not give an exact date for enrollment, but told C4ISRNET it’s still on track to begin this summer.

“The Air Force and Space Force are actually already using our platform,” said Jared Shepard, CEO and president of Hypori, at the TechNet Cyber conference presented by the Armed Forces Communications & Electronics Association International late last month in Baltimore. “Now, they’re going to scale.”

Capitalizing on the need for integrated communications and the pandemic-fueled remote work environment, the Army, including its Reserve and Guard components, already began transitioning service members toward Halo, which as of June 11 became the only way Army.mil users can access Army 365 services from a personal device. Shepard said at the conference that 50,000 Army enrollees are using the service since that BYOD effort began as a pilot in 2022. Hypori was also awarded a contract by the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency on June 6 to give a third of its workforce remote access to secure networks.

“[BYOD] is a top priority for us, and it is a game changer because when our soldiers and airmen are not at the armory, they have to be connected in a secure way,” said Kenneth McNeill, chief information officer of the National Guard Bureau, in a statement February.

Reservists and part-time members of the services especially have limited access to base networks, so giving them the flexibility to complete work from wherever they are will be a boon to the organization, leaders have said.

“In our dynamic environment, the Department of the Air Force is committed to providing user-friendly enterprise solutions which empower the force to work securely in a wide range of operational contexts,” said Air Force Chief Information Officer Venice Goodwine in a statement in March.

The technology also eliminates the need to carry two devices while ensuring their government and personal data are kept separate to minimize liability. The idea of “no data at rest” means there is no risk of compromise if the enrolled devices are stolen or lost, and it ensures that personal information stored on that device is not accessible by the government.

The technology, which also vets users, is also compliant with White House orders that ban TikTok on government devices due to concerns that the social media platform’s Chinese-based parent company, ByteDance, would get access to sensitive data.

“Industry has a responsibility that if it’s doing work for the Department of Defense, that it protects that data,” Shepard said.

I strongly argue that the administration and Congress must unite to fund the Air Force to ensure the continuity of this vital program. They also need to explore alternative design and acquisition strategies to significantly reduce the cost of NGAD and expedite the delivery of this critical capability.

By way of background, the family of systems known as NGAD — which includes a manned, penetrating, counter-air platform and unmanned collaborative combat aircraft — is the result of extensive Air Force and Department of Defense research, which began in 2014. This research concluded that America’s current air dominance assets would not remain sufficiently competitive against the systems of potential adversaries (especially China) into the 2030s.

Then-acquisition chief Frank Kendall was instrumental in this analysis and program from the start. He even made it the linchpin of one of his seven operational imperatives after becoming secretary of the Air Force. With China confirming that it is working on a sixth-generation fighter system to be completed by 2035, the importance of the NGAD program for the Air Force has become all the more apparent.

Enter the Fiscal Responsibility Act and its caps on defense spending; deficit concerns; and the bow-wave effect of must-pay bills for programs like the B-21 bomber, the Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile program and rising personnel costs; the Air Force now finds itself on the horns of a dilemma for FY26 and beyond.

There’s not enough money to pay for all of it.

Moreover, the manned portion of NGAD is predicted to be even more expensive than the F-35 fighter, which, if true, does not bode well for America’s ability to eventually procure an adequate number of fighters. If the program encounters significant delays, the U.S. may once again find itself delivering a capability that has not kept pace with where the threat has advanced.

What, then, should we do?

First, I urge Congress and the DOD to provide adequate funds to the Air Force so that all these important programs remain on track.

Second, I urge the Air Force to consider innovative design and acquisition strategies — perhaps along the lines of the “century series” approach that former Air Force acquisition chief Will Roper once spoke of. This approach would involve less-expensive and quicker-to-produce fighters with iterative designs that could change every few years if necessary. Engaging in discussions with industry on such an approach is crucial, as it represents a very different way of doing business and we need to ensure its feasibility.

It’s time for us to come together, think outside the box and find new ways to support our military’s needs.

The only thing we can say for sure is that China is ruthlessly advancing its NGAD equivalent and does not appear to be slowing down due to budgetary concerns. Moreover, China is continuing aggressive actions in the South China Sea and has stepped up military drills that simulate a blockade and possible invasion of Taiwan.

The 2030s will be upon us in an instant, so we can’t afford to delay NGAD. Doing so would mean risking loss in a future conflict.

Deborah Lee James is a former secretary of the U.S. Air Force. She serves as chair of the Defense Business Board and is affiliated with several organizations and businesses.

While pending budgetary and political outcomes are still many months from resolution, carefully planned and justified digital transformation offers a safe harbor for investment decisions being made today. By finding opportunities to improve government efficiency and productivity while reducing costs, agencies can both gain needed advancements and mitigate risks from current unknowns. The key is readiness to make constructive moves quickly to be well-positioned for momentum and success on Oct. 1.

Starting off strong in FY25

Agency IT leaders may be giving some serious thought as to what to do in the first 100 days of the new budget year. One area ripe with potential is removing systems duplication across agencies with adjacent purposes. Consider one real example: a department within Agency A identifies and certifies individual claimants as legitimate victims of a particular type of crime. Department personnel had traditionally used spreadsheets to collect, track and analyze claimant data to decision benefits entitlement. Automating data collection and tracking allowed on-demand access for the entire program team, but also enabled a dozen other Agency A components to more easily coordinate with Agency B, an integral part of the justice system. Agency A’s productivity skyrocketed, with twice as many victims served in the year after implementation vs. the year before, without increasing budget or staffing; time to victim certification was reduced by half. Their IT investment also eliminated the need for a duplicate system at Agency B, which was now willing to accept Agency A’s certification decision – a win-win for everyone.

Digital transformation can also make a significant improvement in mission outcomes where poor or inconsistent system quality is leading to customer dissatisfaction. The biggest impacts will be found when new technology enables customer self-service, reducing time to benefit and concurrently reducing government employees’ burden of performing lower-value work like filling in forms. Effective planning will also help replace cumbersome, expensive aging technologies to make room for more cost-effective options and processes. Routine, manually-intensive activities could be made significantly better and faster using advanced technologies like artificial intelligence. The resulting talent enablement will empower staff to prioritize activities that are more important, and also likely more fulfilling, supporting workforce retention.

An additional option is to focus on known appropriations priorities (such as infrastructure, the Chips Act or supply chain sustainability, in the recent past). Understanding where the government will be willing to spend can help direct the alignment of an IT organization’s own investment strategy.

Maximizing year-end ‘bonus’ dollars

Agencies that may find themselves with the luxury of obligated but unused FY24 funds can apply that money toward sound end-of-year digital modernization investments that will deliver a big impact. Again, look for where automation can address system duplication or independently recognized poor quality or poor customer satisfaction. This is also a good opportunity to modernize a system that has been either unreliable, compromised, or otherwise proven to have significant shortfalls.

The key is to pursue technology opportunities that will produce a measurable business return. That requires innovative thinking for IT-minded people who often consider new technology only as a means to reducing operations and maintenance (O&M) costs – i.e., moving to the cloud for cheaper data storage or using low code software to reduce development costs. While any savings is helpful, these kinds of reductions have minimal impact, since IT O&M typically represents only a small part of an organization’s total budget.

Instead, approaching IT investment as a means to benefit business productivity (i.e., repurposing labor to higher-value needs or increasing customer transaction capacity with the same number of staff) can produce dramatically higher returns. And, because budgeted O&M expenses will have already been met, any extra end-of-year funds can be applied toward development, modernization and enhancement (DM&E) initiatives that might otherwise not get done, amplifying the payback of this ‘bonus’ money.

If IT leaders need some guidance on this journey, the discipline of Technology Business Management offers a valuable framework and tools that provide a consistent way to measure technology investments so that they can be translated to business value.

Solving a perennial problem

While government fiscal cycles will always impose some annual uncertainty, one thing is certain – the ongoing requirement for digital transformation is sure to continue as long as technology evolves. By focusing investments on business outcomes, agency IT leaders can not only appropriately justify their budgets but also advance their agencies’ mission fulfillment – no matter which direction the political winds may blow.

Jeff Myers is Senior Director of Government Contracts at REI Systems.

The dismissals came at the request of the government — not the defense — citing prosecutorial errors.

Retired U.S. Navy officers Donald Hornbeck, Robert Gorsuch and Jose Luis Sanchez, and U.S. Marine Corps Col. Enrico DeGuzman had all admitted to accepting bribes from defense contractor Leonard Francis, nicknamed “Fat Leonard.”

The enigmatic figure — who was six feet, 3 inches tall and weighed 350 pounds at one time — is at the center of the Navy’s most extensive corruption cases in recent history.

The three pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor charge of disclosing information on Tuesday. The judge also dismissed the entire case against U.S. Navy officer Stephen Shedd. Their defense lawyers could not be immediately reached for comment.

It marked the latest setback to the government’s yearslong efforts in going after dozens of military officials tied to Francis, who pleaded guilty to offering more than $500,000 in cash bribes, along with other gifts and wild sex parties in Southeast Asia, to Navy officials, defense contractors and others. The scheme allowed him to bilk the maritime service out of at least $35 million by getting commanders to redirect ships to ports he controlled and overcharging for services, according to the prosecution.

Francis owned and operated Singapore-based Glenn Defense Marine Asia Ltd., which supplied food, water and fuel to U.S. Navy vessels. He was arrested in 2013 in a sting operation in San Diego.

Prosecutors said in legal filings outlining their request for Tuesday’s dismissals that the action does not mean the defendants did not commit the charged crimes but because information was withheld from the defense and other mistakes were made, they wanted to ensure justice was served fairly.

In 2022, Judge Janis Sammartino had ruled the former lead federal prosecutor committed “flagrant misconduct” by withholding information from defense lawyers. In September, the felony convictions of four former Navy officers were also vacated. The four men pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor and agreed to pay a $100 fine each.

The dismissals come weeks before Francis is due back in court to set a date for his sentencing.

Francis returned to the U.S. late last year after a daring escape from his house arrest in San Diego in 2022. He fled to South America weeks before he was scheduled to be sentenced last year, and was later captured in Venezuela, which extradited him to the U.S. as part of a prisoner exchange.

The escape was also seen by some as a misstep by the prosecution for allowing him to not be held behind bars.

The AbilityOne program is the largest source of employment for people who are blind or have other disabilities. From M16 magazines to baking mix, it supplies $4 billion in products and services to the government each year and employs more than 40,000 workers through partnering non-profit agencies.

The program’s overarching regulatory framework has been largely preserved since it was established in the 1930s, but calls to modernize the program have been voiced for years in order to grow it. As an answer, a new rule finalized in March allows price to be an evaluation factor in contract selection. Because of the program’s unique structure, price is something the program has been able to deemphasize in awards, unlike the rest of the $600 billion contracting sphere.

“The rule is designed to increase transparency, incentivize performance, and ensure that the program remains a trusted source of supply and services for federal agencies, thereby creating and maintaining jobs for people who are blind or have significant disabilities,” said AbilityOne Commission Chairperson Jeffrey Koses in a statement.

Before the rule, a federal agency would bring a contract opportunity to central nonprofit agencies. Then, they would respond with their bids based on past performance and technical capabilities; price was not a factor at that point. Then the central nonprofits would designate a supplier, and the nonprofit and the government would negotiate a fair price that the AbilityOne Commission then confirms.

Now, for new and existing defense contracts over $50 million and civilian contracts over $10 million, competition inclusive of price can be requested. Competition can only be requested by a senior official or, in the services, a flag or general officer. And again, the commission has final authority.

“The rule is written in a way such that factors and subfactors, including technical capability, past performance, training, and placements, are part of the trade-offs that are weighed along with the proposed price,” a commission spokesman told Federal Times. “This was to ensure that the price does not have a disproportionate role in the overall competitive process.”

However, introducing price to the bid selection process is a huge departure from going procedure, nonprofits said in interviews with Federal Times.

“One of the benefits of this program is, once a contract is on the procurement list, you’re not recompeting,” said Dwight Davis, president of Global Connections to Employment. “You’re just repricing it every five years. There’s a whole difference when you’re talking about running a competition.”

Impasse-related competitions are limited to service requirements exceeding $1 million in total value, which the commission estimates would represent a fraction of all contracts.

And though some nonprofits raised concerns about the commission lacking the resources and funding to take on any potential surges in impasse requests, a spokesman for the commission said officials don’t expect the them to increase given agencies still have to exhaust all existing remedies before competition is considered.

Further guidance is forthcoming on implementation of the final rule, the spokesman added, but nonprofit business owners said until they see the regulation fully baked, they are unsure how exactly price will be weighed.

The rule also acknowledges that the award process will consider nonprofits’ investments in training and development of their workforces, though the rule declined to adopt the term “social impact” in its language.

Though these efforts are incentivized in the competitive process, they’re still an unallowable cost.

“When you want people to succeed, you have to have the tools available for them to succeed,” said Jewelyn Cosgrove, vice president of government and public relations, at Melwood, another AbilityOne nonprofit. “But in a price-centric in a world where price has heavier weight, we are going to have to look really closely to ‘how?’ And how far do we go in terms of workforce development?”

Though Cosgrove and Davis said the final rule sought to be responsive to concerns raised by the nonprofit community, implementation guidance will be crucial to ensuring minimum disruption to the AbilityOne workforce, which includes more than 2,500 veterans.

“This is a program that is unique in the contracting space,” said Cosgrove. “And it is unique in the disability space. The next two, three years … is going to tell us far more than what we know today.”

Unfortunately, the steady movement toward government-imposed cybersecurity regulations and enforcement actions poses a dilemma for many companies. Do they allocate resources to secure their environment or to ensure compliance with a multitude of government mandates and reporting rules?

The number of cybersecurity regulations imposed on industry is so voluminous that a core pillar of the Biden administration’s National Cybersecurity Strategy is to harmonize regulations. Yet government agencies continue to issue conflicting mandates that will divert resources from security to compliance.

One such example is the Federal Acquisition Regulations rule on Cyber Threat and Incident Reporting and Information Sharing, proposed by the U.S. Department of Defense, the General Services Administration, and NSA, which is estimated to impact upwards of 94,000 companies that contract with the federal government. This proposed rule alone is conservatively estimated to impose compliance costs of $1.52 billion annually on companies that service the federal government. The benefits, however, are less easy to quantify.

Advocates of mandatory reporting claim that it is necessary so that the government can have a better understanding of cyber threats, which will help them share information on how to defend against the threats.

Even if we accept this claim — that despite the collective resources of the NSA, Cyber Command, the CIA, the FBI, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and a nearly endless number of federal agencies, the government still does not have a sufficient understanding of the threat landscape — the proposed regulations will not achieve the purported goal. Instead, the government will be provided with a tsunami of information with seemingly no filter.

For example, the proposed FAR rule would require companies with government contracts, and their suppliers, to report on every anomaly observed on their network — which the proposed rule calls an incident that “may have occurred”— within eight hours (yes, eight hours) of it being noticed.

Companies investigate potential security incidents every day. Therefore the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency could receive hundreds, potentially thousands, of reports each day on incidents that “may” have occurred. CISA will be quickly overrun with unverified and inaccurate information on security incidents that either didn’t occur or have no impact. The task of sorting through a mammoth amount of data will make it more difficult to provide actionable threat intelligence back to industry.

As such, at a minimum, the FAR regulations should limit mandatory incident reporting to consequential incidents such as those that impact government data or a contractor’s ability to perform its mission.

Other government agencies also are imposing regulations that likely will have a detrimental impact on security. The most high-profile of these is the SEC’s Cybersecurity Risk Management, Strategy, Governance, and Incident Disclosure rule, which creates another set of governance and reporting requirements for publicly traded companies. Under the SEC rules, publicly traded companies would have to publicly announce when they experience a cyber incident that has a “material impact.”

Under these regulations, companies must publicly disclose incidents and certain details even if doing so puts them or other companies at greater risk. For example, if a company is still remediating an attack, it faces the prospect of being attacked again by other actors who know that the company is already busy responding to the initial incident. Public information about a successful attack will undoubtedly be scrutinized and used by attackers.

Companies are anxiously awaiting the next round of regulation, due in March, when CISA issues its initial proposed regulations to implement CIRCIA. This law was passed in 2022 and requires companies to report incidents to CISA within 72 hours. Key areas of focus will be which companies will be required to report incidents and what type of incidents they will need to report.

These examples reflect only a sample of the regulations and mandates from just the federal government. States are developing their own set of cybersecurity requirements. This will make both security and compliance more difficult and costly.

Our nation faces a complex range of cyber threats. Nation-states are using their cyber armies to attack America’s critical infrastructure and government. They are actively stealing intellectual property and, according to the FBI, are lurking on networks waiting to pounce when the time is right. Unfortunately, the government’s response to this is to create a complex regulatory, compliance, and reporting environment that is both duplicative and contradictory.

It may not be realistic to begin the immediate rolling back of regulations and mandates. However, it is essential that the government collectively pause on issuing new cybersecurity regulations and mandates to focus on the much-needed regulatory harmonization.

Scott C. Algeier is Executive Director at IT-ISAC, a not for profit organization of companies dedicated to enhancing cybersecurity by sharing threat information.

The topic was consolidation. The Cold War was over, which meant America would spend less on defense. That also meant less money for the companies in the room. Officials flashed a black-and-white graph onto the wall, showing a plunge in how many contractors the Pentagon could afford. Companies would likely need to merge if they wanted to survive.

Norm Augustine — then-chief executive of Martin Marietta, which itself merged in 1995 to become Lockheed Martin — had been there, sitting beside the defense secretary. A day later, he returned to the Pentagon and grabbed a copy of that chart, expecting it to be a historic document. He still has it today.

Within a decade, the number of large prime contractors plummeted from 51 to five, creating the modern defense industry. Lockheed merged with Martin. Boeing merged with McDonnell Douglas.

“Sitting there at the Last Supper, I felt like I was sitting in a historical pivot point,” Augustine told Defense News. “They did the best [with] a bad hand, and we’re now paying the price for the bad hand.”

That price is a defense sector that can’t move as quickly as the Pentagon wants it to. America is now supplying materiel for the wars in Ukraine and Israel, which started a year and a half apart. The high demand has strained an industry that often struggled to meet needs long before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

And these wars aren’t even the Defense Department’s top priority; that’s China, whose massive military buildup over the last 20 years is the pace America’s leaders say they must match. Nowhere is this clearer than in the Pentagon’s new defense-industrial strategy, which says China’s industrial might in many areas “vastly exceeds” that of the U.S. and its allies.

In response, the plan calls for “generational” investment in the industrial base. To do so, the Pentagon is now showing a new set of graphs.

Bill LaPlante, the department’s top weapons buyer, has a wall in his office covered with images plotting how long it would take to build more missiles and other munitions. His deputies are sharing these with company after company, he said — though the Pentagon isn’t making them public.

Call it a tale of two charts: In 30 years, the Pentagon went from a defense industry it considered too large to sustain, to one now too small to surge. To understand that path, Defense News spoke with analysts and industry executives as well as top industrial base policy officials dating back to the Clinton administration. They likened the sector to something of a spring-loaded door — where capacity slammed shut due to smaller budgets, changing preferences and a thinning workforce.

That door is now creaking open again as America retools its defense industry, workforce and suppliers to compete with an advanced adversary.

“It’s dusting off a lot of skills that we’ve had in this country that we haven’t used in a while,” LaPlante told reporters in December at the Reagan National Defense Forum.

Industrial base 101

Experts on America’s defense industry tend to speak about it like an intro economics course. They often note the sector doesn’t move like other markets.

Defense companies build what governments want, but rarely any more or anything different. The Pentagon’s orders, hence, have an unusual amount of sway over the shape of the companies fulfilling them.

“The defense industry is hypersensitive to and responsive to its customers,” said Steve Grundman, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council think tank.

Grundman worked in the Pentagon in the 1990s, in the wake of the peace dividend. Military spending had surged under the Reagan administration as the U.S. competed with the Soviet Union. But when the USSR dissolved in 1991, ending the Cold War, America had no opponents left to outcompete. Defense spending fell each fiscal year from 1985 to 1998, according to the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments think tank.

Specifically, the Pentagon’s spending on procurement, research, development and construction dropped 44% during that time period, CSBA found.

America needed a defense industry built for peacetime. So arrived the Last Supper, a name Augustine himself gave the 1993 dinner. Even at the time, he said, it appeared to be sound policy. Defense spending was bound to fall, leaving the Pentagon with two choices: a sprawling industry versus a smaller, more efficient one.

Defense officials encouraged the latter. Alongside the plummet of prime contractors, the number of mid-tier and small suppliers also cratered as companies merged in order to lower costs.

Eventually the government said enough was enough. In the late 1990s, it blocked Lockheed Martin’s plan to buy Northrop Grumman. The era of major consolidation was over.

Its effects were twofold: less competition and less ability to surge. The first, in many cases, has meant the Pentagon’s orders take longer, cost more and are vulnerable to brittle supply chains. The second — caused both by consolidation and more efficient manufacturing techniques — makes it harder to respond to sudden conflicts.

Heading into the 2000s, leaders in large part began to favor weapons that were more advanced but would be fewer in number. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld labeled it a “transformation” that would vault the Pentagon’s arsenal a whole generation ahead.

Some of these advanced weapons — such as the Army’s Future Combat System and the Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship — did not work out as intended. And the shift toward fewer, more capable systems further encouraged companies to consolidate.

In 1998, five companies built surface ships and two made tracked combat vehicles. By 2020, those numbers had fallen to two and one respectively.

“As dumb as it sounds, given how much we spend on defense, oftentimes the volume for any single supplier isn’t enough,” said Dave Bassett, a retired Army lieutenant general, who until December ran the Defense Contract Management Agency.

‘A wake-up call’

The peace dividend did not survive America’s wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The 9/11 attacks followed by the two conflicts swelled the Defense Department’s budget. When adjusted for inflation and including supplemental funding, Pentagon spending rose an average of 7% from fiscal 1999 to fiscal 2008, according to CSBA.

This spending went toward a new set of threats.

As an example, Bassett and other experts interviewed by Defense News singled out a class of heavily armored vehicles developed for the wars. The mine-resistant, ambush-protected vehicle program was Defense Secretary Bob Gates’ top priority. With heavy investment, the Pentagon fielded more than 13,000 MRAP vehicles in three years.

The program has since become a talisman for some who argue the defense industry can move nimbly if given the proper resources. But it’s also a reminder of where those resources went for more than 15 years. From 2001 onward, the Pentagon needed weapons for counterinsurgencies.

Those are far from what Ukraine needs to defend itself against Russia — an industrial-age war defined by the use of artillery and small drones. Even further are the needs of defending Taiwan, an island nation threatened by a leading manufacturing powerhouse.

“If what you’re facing is an Iraqi threat, you’re probably not going to have the same capacity as when you face a Russian and the Chinese threat,” said Bill Lynn, deputy defense secretary during the Obama administration and now chief executive of Leonardo DRS.

And the change in capacity had become clear to defense officials.

Brett Lambert, who ran industrial base policy for the Pentagon while Lynn was deputy secretary, remembers a tornado in 2011 that struck Joplin, Missouri — nearly hitting a major battery supplier.

“We realized that even though the plant itself was not hit, we didn’t have a backup,” Lambert said. “That was a wake-up call to me.”

Another warning came in the form of a four-year study of major weapons programs Lambert helped lead. He found, in large part, that prime contractors didn’t understand their own supply chains.

But while the alarm went off, no one woke up, said Robert Lusardi, a former Pentagon industry official. The study’s data, he noted, largely faded into the ether.

“Nobody used it,” he said.

‘There’s never just one problem’

Eric Chewning was vacationing with his family at the Outer Banks in summer 2017.

Sitting on the North Carolina beach with his kids, Chewning — then a partner at the consulting firm McKinsey and Co. — scrolled through his phone and saw a news release about an executive order. President Donald Trump was instructing the Pentagon’s first top-down review of its defense-industrial base since the Eisenhower administration.

“I say to myself: ‘Who are they going to get to do that?’ ” Chewning told Defense News in an interview.

Later that day, he was walking back from the beach when he got a call from the Pentagon asking if he would interview for the top industrial base policy role. In October, he took the job, which meant he would be the one running the study.

“The mindset was: How do we holistically now transition ourselves from the post-9/11 wars, where there really wasn’t ever a question around our ability to generate enough material capability, to one focused on competition with an economic peer?” Chewning said.

What he found is that doing so wouldn’t be easy — in large part because of what was happening with the American workforce. By the time the defense industry consolidated in the 1990s, the U.S. was decades into a deep manufacturing slide.

From the late 1970s to 2017, the country lost 7.1 million manufacturing jobs, or 36% of the sector’s workforce, according to the study Chewning led. Such declines serve as a challenge to any attempt to quickly bulk up America’s defense industry. Even with more advanced factories that now heavily rely on robotics, weapons still need people who know how to build them.

This is part of why capacity is so difficult to add once it’s gone, said Bassett, the retired Army general. It takes years to find and train skilled workers, as companies across the country have seen in the recently tight labor market.

While leading the Defense Contract Management Agency, Bassett studied business traits that would help predict manufacturing problems. A significant one he found was the share of blue-collar employees who had been on the job for less than a year; once it reached a certain threshold, he said, quality issues were almost guaranteed.

While the 2018 study led to some reforms, it did not reverse the trend in manufacturing, which only got worse as older workers retired en masse during the COVID-19 pandemic. Like many reports in Washington, it pointed to major issues that existed alongside other difficulties, all competing for time and money.

“There’s never just one problem,” said Chewning, now a vice president at the shipbuilder HII. “The immediate problems get the most attention.”

By 2022, the problem had become immediate. Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and Washington continued sending weapons to aid Kyiv.

The U.S. has given Ukraine a staggering amount of security aid — more than $44 billion since February 2022. Despite that sum, one of the lessons for many in the Pentagon has been that industry was unprepared for a crisis.

Arguably, nowhere is this more obvious than in America’s supply of 155mm artillery shells.

The 155mm round — next to small drones – has defined fighting in Ukraine. For self-defense, Kyiv needs 60,000-80,000 shells per month, Michael Kofman, an analyst at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, told Defense News.

That rate well surpasses the pace at which Ukraine’s Western allies could resupply them. Even with an extra $1.5 billion from Congress in 2023 to increase production, America was making 28,000-30,000 shells in December, said LaPlante, who is in charge of acquisition and sustainment at the Pentagon.

The Defense Department’s goal is to reach 100,000 rounds per month by the middle of 2025. But that pace likely won’t be possible without more funding from Congress, which has stalled a security spending bill requested by the White House.

But funding hasn’t slowed down production in recent years; from FY16 to FY23, Congress added 7.3%, or $79.3 billion, to the White House’s requested Pentagon procurement fund, according to CSBA. The problem is inconsistent demand, which LaPlante illustrated with another chart last fall.

Starting with the Gulf War 30 years ago, munition orders have gone up and down in a series of peaks and valleys: A crisis breaks out, the Pentagon surges supply, it reaches the number a couple years later, then the crisis wanes and supply falls.

“That’s one of the challenges that we have now — that inability to make adjustments because of the lack of investment that we’ve made to the industrial base historically,” Justin McFarlin, who leads industrial base development for the Pentagon, told Defense News.

Munitions are often at high risk for such whiplash. Eric Fanning noticed this pattern after years of holding senior positions with the Navy, the Air Force and the Army. Much of each service’s spending power was sewed up in large systems, such as aircraft carriers and fighter jets. More inexpensive items ended up tapered to make the budget fit. And because the Pentagon’s demand affects supply, the companies fulfilling those orders trimmed capacity over time.

Now orders are up again — this time for 155mm shells and a bevy of other munitions. For some, Congress has allowed the Pentagon to issue long-term contracts that keep demand stable for years. But for others, companies are left worrying government demand won’t last, according to Fanning, now head of the Aerospace Industries Association.

“That sense of long-term commitment is still not quite there,” he said.

‘First contact with the enemy’

The Pentagon says it’s signaling future commitments in its new industrial base strategy. The document focuses on four areas: creating resilient supply chains, ensuring workforce readiness, creating business-friendly acquisition policies and bolstering the national security marketplace.

“These are not new ideas,” Halimah Najieb-Locke, acting deputy for industrial base policy, told Defense News. “But they haven’t been said with the [needed] authority.”

In a separate briefing with reporters in January, Najieb-Locke previewed the Pentagon’s goals for its defense-industrial base over the next three to five years. One is to speed up long-lead items, such as ball bearings or solid-rocket motors that slow down the production of important weapons. Others include retooling obsolete parts of the supply chain and using more funding from the Defense Production Act, which allows the Pentagon to issue national security-related grants.

“We no longer can afford to ignore [issues in the industrial base] and hope for better,” Najieb-Locke told Defense News. “We have to take decisive action.”

But there are problems outside of the Pentagon’s control.

The first is politics. As of publication, Congress had yet to pass a full defense spending bill — the latest entry in more than a decade of continuing resolutions. Defense remains a largely bipartisan issue, but there is a widening gap within the Republican Party — one reason Congress hasn’t passed additional aid for Ukraine, Israel and Taiwan.

Today’s security environment “demands a substantial, long-term increase in resources for our national defense,” Sen. Roger Wicker, R-Miss., the ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, told Defense News in a statement.

Some of his colleagues in the House are more skeptical. “The American people work diligently to earn every dollar, but it seems the [Defense Department] has become a master of squandering those funds without batting an eye,” Rep. Glenn Grothman, R-Wis., told Defense News in December.

The second external problem is innovation. In decades past, the Pentagon used to be upstream of new technology — think GPS or the internet. It’s since found itself downstream, said Lynn, the former deputy defense secretary, and much of the current advances in artificial intelligence and drones are coming from the commercial sector.

Learning how to better work with these companies is one of the strategy’s goals. Doing so, said Najieb-Locke, will involve updating the Pentagon’s buying policies to better align with the commercial sector — a market that the Pentagon has less influence over.

“Because of that rapid change [in technology], a lot of our assumptions of what will be there in time of need have [proved] to be in some cases overblown,” said Najieb-Locke.

A third challenge is America’s adversaries. The Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Hamas wars are a reminder that competitors ultimately help decide how fast America’s defense industry must work, and when.

Chris Michienzi learned this lesson from her time working on the Pentagon’s industrial base policy. For about eight years she helped steer the department’s approach to industry and saw challenges evolve. When the war in Ukraine began in 2022, she was one of a few officials working on aid to Kyiv.

Many of the problems of the last 30 years were on display. A worker shortage hampered attempts to surge key munitions, she cited as an example.

“The department gets the industrial base that it pays for,” she said.

Michienzi left her post last summer. In January, when Defense News spoke with McFarlin, who leads industrial base development for the Pentagon, the interview took place in Michienzi’s old office — a small, windowless cube.

No one had filled the space, and it was instead turned into a conference room — helpful for McFarlin as he briefed companies on the government’s new strategy.

“The saying I grew up [with] was: No plan survives first contact with the enemy,” McFarlin said. “We can plan, but we also have to be able to pivot and adjust.”

A bold vision requires bold action, and the most effective way for the U.S. government to take the lead in realizing the change it and its partners seek in the digital world is to get its own house in order. To do so, it must prioritize ensuring that its marketplace reflects the values it promotes by addressing the risks that persist from its IT monoculture.

The federal government is the largest consumer of goods and services in the world, spending roughly $600 billion each year—including more than $100 billion on IT and cyber investments. A large majority of these investments are directed toward Microsoft. Relying so heavily on a single IT provider not only increases the target profile of that provider, but also limits the ability of the government to defend itself against future cyberattacks. As Sen. Eric Schmitt, R-Mo.,recently stated, “only meaningfully employing one vendor” creates a single point of failure that adversaries can exploit.”

These concerns have been echoed across government agencies, including the U.S. Departments of Veterans Affairs and Defense. Current and former officials tied the VA’s move to go “all-in” on a single vendor to the accidental disclosure of 1,500 U.S. veterans’ personal data. Similarly, former DoD senior officials questioned the department’s decision to replace its long-running cybersecurity program with off-the-shelf tools from the same vendor providing the DoD’s software and cloud services, calling the move an “unacceptable level of risk” for the department.

In December, with the passage of the 2024 National Defense Authorization Act came lawmakers’ agreement to a key insert to the act by Sen. Schmitt (section 1553) compelling the Department of Defense (DoD) to assess the cybersecurity capabilities of the technologies it uses so as to ensure competition and interoperability—the concern being that both competition and interoperability are hindered by the DoD’s overreliance on legacy vendors. Cybersecurity experts know that an impartial analysis will likely find the DoD’s overreliance on a single vendor is severely limiting competition and interoperability, and is as a result a threat to U.S. national security.

The DoD represents the largest portion of the U.S. government marketplace, but the need to diversify IT and cybersecurity vendors extends across the government and aligns with the Biden Administration’s National Cybersecurity Strategy. The strategy is rooted in two central themes: rebalancing the responsibility to defend cyberspace and realigning incentives to favor long-term investments. As part of this, the U.S. government and major technology providers are called on to protect data, assure the reliability of critical systems, and make cyberspace more resilient and defensible over the long term.

The best place to start is in its own marketplace—where the U.S. government has the most control. For the government to best protect its systems and invest in a secure digital ecosystem, it must foster greater competition and diversify the vendors it relies on to provide and secure its digital ecosystem. Doing so would drive the values the administration seeks to realize in the broader digital world and enhance our national security posture. Additionally, such a move in the largest marketplace in the world would be a major incentive to drive change and almost certainly reduce the need for extensive regulation to enforce an open, free, interoperable market.

Until the U.S. government’s marketplace exemplifies its vision for the broader digital world, it can’t expect to lead others in realizing such a vision—at home or abroad. The U.S. government should prioritize leading by example and ensure its IT marketplace fosters competition, privacy, and security, and ultimately by selecting a more diverse set of cybersecurity and IT vendors. In this way, the U.S. government will lead by example, not exception, in bringing about the global internet and technology ecosystem that it envisions at home and abroad.

Cory Simpson is the founder and CEO of Gray Space Strategies, Inc., a professional services and strategic advisory firm based in Washington, D.C., and serves as CEO of the Institute for Critical Infrastructure and as a Senior Advisor to the Cyberspace Solarium Commission.

Now that we have had time to evaluate the results of this watershed moment, it is imperative that America charts a new course toward a robust semiconductor strategy to safeguard our national security and our economy.

Today, China and Taiwan combined have nearly three quarters of the global market share of semiconductors, which poses a threat to the U.S. economy and its critical military products and systems. Recent international developments have cast a stark spotlight on the decided deficiencies of the current global, voluntary export control framework known as the Wassenaar Arrangement. Russia’s brazen invasion of Ukraine and China’s multifaceted gray zone war against Taiwan have laid bare the shortcomings of this voluntary association.

In this era of relentless global geopolitics and intense technological competition, we find ourselves at a pivotal juncture where the bedrock of our future security lies in a semiconductor treaty firmly rooted in the Wassenaar Arrangement but fortified with substantial revisions, all with a keen focus on the indispensable semiconductor industry.

The Wassenaar Arrangement, conceived as a voluntary global export control alliance, was designed to facilitate information exchange among member nations regarding technologies, including semiconductors, that have military or military-civilian applications. The goal, as articulated by the Arms Control Association, is to promote “greater responsibility” in military exports and prevent “destabilizing accumulations” of weapons. This arrangement was never intended to target specific regions or groups of states, and members lacked veto authority over each other’s exports, rendering it a voluntary association.

The United States, alongside 41 other nations, stands as a member, while Russia, also a member, has repeatedly exposed the inadequacies of this voluntary accord. The absence of a robust global semiconductor export control regime leaves the United States vulnerable in the technological race, especially as China, conspicuously absent from the Wassenaar Arrangement, seeks to surge ahead.

The time has come for the United States to lead the charge in crafting an international treaty governing the export of advanced semiconductors, involving key allies that constitute the backbone of the semiconductor supply chain: Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, South Korea and Taiwan. This coalition can fittingly be christened the “Semi Allies Group.”

We must elevate the Wassenaar Arrangement to the status of a binding Wassenaar Treaty, targeting nations such as China, Russia, Iran and North Korea, which pose military and economic threats to the founding members. Our primary focus should be on semiconductor technology, a linchpin of both our economic prosperity and national defense. This treaty framework would grant each member veto authority over another member’s proposed exports.

Converting parts of the Wassenaar Arrangement into a specialized treaty would address its glaring inadequacies by concentrating on the key semiconductor supply chain leaders, honing in on a single critical technology, targeting a specific group of destabilizing nations and providing all participating members with the much-needed veto authority.

The existing U.S. tactics of unilaterally imposing ever-stricter unilateral export controls on domestic companies selling to China, combined with efforts to persuade other key nations to follow suit, is far from ideal for American military defense and its semiconductor businesses. They cannot rely on the United States indefinitely convincing foreign competitors — particularly in export-driven economies like Germany, the Netherlands, South Korea, Japan and Taiwan — to refrain from selling advanced semiconductor technology to China. The U.S. military should support this multilateral treaty approach because it keeps the most advanced technology out of the hands of our fiercest foes.

Likewise, U.S. semiconductor businesses should also rally behind this approach, recognizing that if they are barred from exporting a specific semiconductor technology to China, their primary commercial rivals will face similar restrictions.

The geopolitical landscape has undergone profound changes, with NATO uniting against Russia’s Ukraine invasion and the Quad — comprising the U.S., Japan, India, and Australia — aligning to counter China’s expansionist ambitions. These developments present golden opportunities for multinational cooperation in matters of defense.

The establishment of a Wassenaar Treaty will not be without challenges, such as securing a two-thirds vote in the U.S. Senate. Nevertheless, it is a challenge worth pursuing. Bipartisan support for the CHIPS and Science Act as well as shared concerns about China’s threat to Taiwan suggest the political will may exist at this critical juncture in time.

Effective export controls on semiconductors within the Semi Allies Group, under the proposed Wassenaar Treaty, could pave the way for the inclusion of other critical aspects of the global semiconductor trade. The Biden administration’s efforts to coordinate subsidies supporting specific members of the Semi Allies Group’s industrial policies align with the goal of promoting domestic semiconductor manufacturing, thus averting production surpluses or redundant government investments. This subsidy coordination could also become an additional focus under the treaty.

Furthermore, the Biden administration’s recent executive order issued on Aug. 9, 2023 — instructing the Treasury Department to develop regulations prohibiting American investment in certain advanced technologies, including semiconductors, in China for military purposes — underscores the necessity of multilateral, coordinated restrictions on outbound investments in China among the Semi Allies Group. This ensures that U.S. private equity and venture capital are not unfairly disadvantaged while their counterparts in other member countries remain free to invest. This, too, could become another facet for the Semi Allies Group to coordinate under the treaty.

The time has come for the United States to take resolute action in safeguarding its national security interests. The vulnerabilities of the Wassenaar Arrangement have been laid bare by recent events. We have witnessed the consequences of timid responses to Russia’s invasions of Moldova in 1992, Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014. We cannot afford to be complacent. By establishing a Wassenaar Treaty with a laser focus on semiconductors, we can address the glaring gap in our export control framework for this critical technology. The moment has arrived to secure our technological edge and protect our nation’s future. The time for action is now.

André Brunel is an international technology attorney with Reiter, Brunel and Dunn. This commentary was adapted from his article published in the Journal of Business & Technology Law. The views and opinions expressed in this commentary are his and do not necessarily reflect the views or positions of the law firm or any clients it represents.