I strongly argue that the administration and Congress must unite to fund the Air Force to ensure the continuity of this vital program. They also need to explore alternative design and acquisition strategies to significantly reduce the cost of NGAD and expedite the delivery of this critical capability.

By way of background, the family of systems known as NGAD — which includes a manned, penetrating, counter-air platform and unmanned collaborative combat aircraft — is the result of extensive Air Force and Department of Defense research, which began in 2014. This research concluded that America’s current air dominance assets would not remain sufficiently competitive against the systems of potential adversaries (especially China) into the 2030s.

Then-acquisition chief Frank Kendall was instrumental in this analysis and program from the start. He even made it the linchpin of one of his seven operational imperatives after becoming secretary of the Air Force. With China confirming that it is working on a sixth-generation fighter system to be completed by 2035, the importance of the NGAD program for the Air Force has become all the more apparent.

Enter the Fiscal Responsibility Act and its caps on defense spending; deficit concerns; and the bow-wave effect of must-pay bills for programs like the B-21 bomber, the Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile program and rising personnel costs; the Air Force now finds itself on the horns of a dilemma for FY26 and beyond.

There’s not enough money to pay for all of it.

Moreover, the manned portion of NGAD is predicted to be even more expensive than the F-35 fighter, which, if true, does not bode well for America’s ability to eventually procure an adequate number of fighters. If the program encounters significant delays, the U.S. may once again find itself delivering a capability that has not kept pace with where the threat has advanced.

What, then, should we do?

First, I urge Congress and the DOD to provide adequate funds to the Air Force so that all these important programs remain on track.

Second, I urge the Air Force to consider innovative design and acquisition strategies — perhaps along the lines of the “century series” approach that former Air Force acquisition chief Will Roper once spoke of. This approach would involve less-expensive and quicker-to-produce fighters with iterative designs that could change every few years if necessary. Engaging in discussions with industry on such an approach is crucial, as it represents a very different way of doing business and we need to ensure its feasibility.

It’s time for us to come together, think outside the box and find new ways to support our military’s needs.

The only thing we can say for sure is that China is ruthlessly advancing its NGAD equivalent and does not appear to be slowing down due to budgetary concerns. Moreover, China is continuing aggressive actions in the South China Sea and has stepped up military drills that simulate a blockade and possible invasion of Taiwan.

The 2030s will be upon us in an instant, so we can’t afford to delay NGAD. Doing so would mean risking loss in a future conflict.

Deborah Lee James is a former secretary of the U.S. Air Force. She serves as chair of the Defense Business Board and is affiliated with several organizations and businesses.

The Ides of March came this year with chilling notice from U.S. government agencies that Russian hackers have attained a foothold within the systems that control our country’s most critical systems — the electric grid, water processing facilities, air transportation, and even nuclear facilities.

Details of the threats came out in news reports, but are perhaps best summed up by a Department of Homeland Security updated warning to industry which included a screenshot taken by Russian operatives that showed they could penetrate the targeted companies’ critical controls.

The threat actors, as DHS calls the state-sponsored hackers, gained access through clever and persistent spear-phishing and watering-hole ruses. They then used standard Windows processes to exploit or leverage registry and other file types to manipulate credentials, alter or create scheduled tasks, crack passwords and manipulate remote access services to connect to intended targets. The objective, according to authorities, seemed to be internal reconnaissance and espionage suggesting intent to disrupt or disable critical systems, should such an advantage prove opportune in the future.

It appears the only thing keeping these threat actors from shutting down these vital systems is political motivation. And that means it is past time for industry-wide adoption of comprehensive, defense-in-depth cybersecurity. That includes the type of cybersecurity that’s already in place across U.S. military facilities nationwide, and the kind of security widely and readily available to private and highly regulated businesses within and beyond U.S. borders.

The typical cyber-defense methodology has been based on simple system architectures tying together office PCs, usually managed by IT specialists rather than cybersecurity specialists. This line of defense consistently proves inadequate as intrusions become more sophisticated.

Particularly underserved by deeply-layered cybersecurity are the machine-to-machine systems driving the military and civilian industrial sector. They are powered by countless sensors embedded into industrial control networks for purposes that include thermal imaging, radar tracking and climate control. These sensors, also known as programmable logical controllers, are typically equipped to perform a single function. They lack the design for software upgrades that can protect them natively from malware. As a result, cyberattacks introduced through such a network pose potentially life-threatening risks to the infrastructure that drives power grids, transportation systems, dams, hospitals, airports and more.

In the most recent alert, DHS stated that, in multiple instances, “the threat actors accessed workstations and servers on a corporate network that contained data output from control systems within energy generation facilities. The threat actors accessed files pertaining to ICS [industrial control systems] or supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems…The threat actors targeted and copied profile and configuration information for accessing ICS systems on the network. DHS observed the threat actors copying Virtual Network Connection (VNC) profiles that contained configuration information on accessing ICS systems.”

This means that state-sponsored cyber-enemies essentially used Windows to burrow deep into industrial controls; once in, they could manipulate operations.

U.S. defense organizations have been consistent supporters of deeply layered security that extends protections beyond the standard firewall. The objective is to mitigate intrusions, such as these latest, once they’ve breached the network’s first line of defense.

Solutions in use by U.S. agencies, including DoD and DHS, are readily available to the private sector. Some secure the endpoints of these vital machine-to-machine networks. They essentially wrap firewalls around sensors within an ICS using small pieces of hardware that plug directly into the sensor to act as a fence between the machine and its connection to the rest of the network.

If malware traverses the network, the cybersecurity devices and software will control what the machine can do, and whether it will respond at all. If the wrong person ― one who has not been pre-approved, or “whitelisted” ― tries to engage or direct the sensor, the sensor will not respond. The security software also will send an alarm to authorized personnel.

Had such a system been in place across the utilities and other companies DHS and the FBI left unnamed in the current situation, the infrastructure would not have been so seriously breached.

Once again, industry is shown that cybersecurity must be in place as part of an end-to-end architecture. Security experts and operators of as-yet-uncompromised industrial systems know that every device on a network must be identified, secured and authenticated to ensure that data is consistently transmitted unaltered, and only to intended recipients.

U.S. industries and citizens deserve to be better protected from enemies that may opt to shut down hospitals, airports and factories anywhere, or anytime, they choose.

Deborah Lee James was the 23rd secretary of the US Air Force and is currently a special advisor to Ultra Electronics, 3eTI. She leads a wide range of strategic initiatives for 3eTI with a focus on defense-oriented programs that improve operations while cyber securing automated system endpoints.