The Coalition for Government Procurement has long supported common-sense solutions to streamline federal procurement processes, modernize procurement policies, and utilize commercial practices to the maximum extent practicable. Policies and programs that effectively and efficiently leverage the commercial marketplace are essential for the delivery of best value commercial products, services and solutions for federal customers and the American people.

These days, it appears that increasingly the dialogue regarding the condition of the federal acquisition systems has soured, as a seemingly ever-growing inventory of the deficiencies and shortcomings has overtaken the conversation. Indeed, more and more we are told that the procurement process is in crisis, that it is unable to sustain access to innovative technologies, and that it is an obsolete relic of a bygone era.

The inherent reaction to this narrative is the call for the implementation of new reforms — i.e. policies, statutes, and regulations — to completely overhaul the procurement process. Before embracing this conclusion, however, we should reflect upon both the historical context of the procurement process and the lessons we have learned over time.

In particular, it is important to understand how Congress, with the enactment of the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) in 1994, has already reformed the procurement system. As recognized by the recently published first volume of the report of the Section 809 Advisory Panel on Streamlining and Codifying Acquisition (Section 809 Panel), FASA:

… established a definition for the term commercial item, a preference for procuring commercial items, an emphasis on commercial market research, greater reliance of commercial sector business processes, a requirement to use standard commercial terms and conditions to the maximum extent practicable, waiver of many statutes that would otherwise have been applicable to commercial items, and a framework for maintaining a limit on the number of future statutes that may be applied to procurements of commercial items.

The Section 809 Panel, however, also noted that:

Since FASA was implemented, the number of DoD-related commercial buying provisions and clauses has increased by 188 percent, and the number of commercial clauses that may be flowed down has increased five-fold. In 1995, the FAR and DFARS contained a combined total of 57 government clauses applicable to commercial items. Today there are 165 clauses, with 122 originating in statute, 20 originating in executive orders, and 23 originating in agency-level policies.

In addition, we should consider the testimony on major weapons system acquisition provided in 2013 by Paul Francis of the Government Accountability Office before the House Armed Services Committee.

In his testimony, Paul discussed DoD’s performance in executing these acquisitions, the current policies and processes guiding these acquisitions, and opined that the department should adapt its future reforms so that they better address “… the incentives to deviate from sound acquisition processes.”

Significantly, although GAO had found that past reforms had promoted well-founded management practices, these reforms were not institutionalized by many of the Department’s programs and components because of these “incentives to deviate,” including, but not limited to the conflicting demands, the dynamics of the funding process, and the limited authority of managers. Regarding how its findings should impact the design of future reforms, GAO provided the following:

… we should build on existing reforms — not necessarily by revisiting the process itself but by augmenting it by tackling incentives. To do this, we need to look differently at the familiar outcomes of weapon systems acquisition—such as cost growth, schedule delays, large support burdens, and reduced buying power. Some of these undesirable outcomes … occur not because they are inadvertent but because they are encouraged by the incentive structure. I do not think it is sufficient to define the problem as an objective process that is broken. Rather, it is more accurate to view the problem as a sophisticated process whose consistent results are indicative of its being in equilibrium. The rules and policies are clear about what to do, but other incentives force compromises. The persistence of undesirable outcomes such as cost growth and schedule delays suggests that these are consequences that participants in the process have been willing to accept.

In light of the forgoing, before strapping dynamite to the procurement system, we would do well to reflect on the incentives inherent to the system, how they can be rebalanced in light of current policy imperatives, and adjust our buying practices, including our rules, accordingly. To do otherwise, risks perpetuating the cycle of reform and re-regulation that we have seen over the decades.

Roger Waldron is president of the Coalition for Government Procurement and brings more than 25 years of government contracting experience, including 20 years with the General Services Administration.